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The Ninth Circuit on the Refugee EO: The Government’s Least Bad Option
By Peter Margulies  Friday, February 10, 2017, 4:14 PM
Faced with the Ninth Circuit decision declining to stay the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against President Trump’s EO, the
government must now choose between an array of bad options. To that end, the “least bad” option would be to rescind the current EO and
replace it with a new EO that clearly exempts both lawful permanent residents (LPRs) and previously admitted nonimmigrant visa-holders
(VHs), such as students and medical residents. (In fact, NBC News reports that White House lawyers have been busy rewriting the EO for
several days.)
From the government’s standpoint, the cardinal virtue of the approach I recommend is the opportunity to preserve portions of the EO that
are legally defensible, including its pause in admission of noncitizens who have not already been admitted into the United States. Josh
Blackman has urged the same path.
The government had previously indicated that the EO doesn’t cover LPRs, so making that clear on the face of a new EO sacri½ces nothing. In
addition, the Justice Department’s reply brief in the Ninth Circuit signaled ¾exibility on the status of previously admitted nonimmigrant
VHs. There are strong arguments that this group has recourse against arbitrary government action via the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) (see my post here on the EO as arbitrary action that violates the structure and purpose of the Immigration and Nationality Act [INA]).
So the government loses little here, except perhaps a bit of pride. However, losing pride is better than making bad law, which is what the
government risks if it fails to take the course urged above. 
 
I. The Government’s Predicament
If the government fails to rewrite the EO along these lines, it will be “in a box,” albeit one that it has made for itself (see Jane Chong’s post
here). To seek a stay from the Supreme Court, the government would have to ask Justice Kennedy, the Circuit Justice for the Ninth Circuit.
According to long-standing Supreme Court case law, Justice Kennedy would have to ½nd a “fair prospect” that a majority of the Court would
vote to reverse the lower court. Here’s the problem: the Court would likely split 4-4 in this case.
We know that because the four liberal Justices (Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan) dissented from the Court’s deferential decision in
Kerry v. Din (2015). They wanted stronger Due Process protections for a U.S. citizen whose spouse was denied an immigrant visa based on an
unspeci½ed terrorism-related subsection of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). Since these four Justices might view due process
concerns in the EO case the same way, Justice Kennedy would have dif½culty ½nding a “fair prospect” of reversal (even if Justice Kennedy
himself would vote that way, which is unclear in this case).
Moreover, whether the government could get a stay from Justice Kennedy is actually beside the point, given the current Court’s 4-4
con½guration. If the four liberal Justices sided with the EO’s challengers on the merits, the result would be a 4-4 per curiam af½rmance of the
Ninth Circuit with no opinion—an anticlimactic result ironically reminiscent of last Term’s disposition in United States v. Texas, which
resulted in upholding the Fifth Circuit’s invalidation of President Obama’s immigration initiative, Deferred Action for Parents of Americans.
 
II. Why the Ninth Circuit’s Decision Creates Bad Law
There’s a lot of bad law and super½cial analysis in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion (see Ben’s discussion here). The court started off on the right
foot: the states have standing and the EO is reviewable. However, the court’s analysis of the due process issues unduly in¾ated protections
for noncitizens who have not yet been admitted to the United States. The court’s reasoning on due process protections for this group would
hamstring visa determinations here and abroad. The result would be a loss of ¾exibility that the Supreme Court has never endorsed, well
beyond anything suggested by Justice Breyer’s dissent in Kerry v. Din.
Following the analysis that Justices Kennedy and Alito assumed without deciding and that the four liberal Justices accepted in Kerry v. Din,
the Ninth Circuit found “potential” due process claims based on U.S. citizens’ family ties with noncitizens abroad who had not previously
been admitted to the United States. The Ninth Circuit also suggested that a U.S. institution, such as a university in Washington State, might
have “rights of its own to assert” in the establishment of certain procedures for processing of visa applications for noncitizens abroad.
However, beyond noting these “potential” claims, the court said little about the claims’ content. The “likelihood of success” standard
required that the Ninth Circuit analyze those claims far more concretely. That comprehensive analysis would have revealed the weakness of
the due process claims for noncitizens not previously admitted.
At most, Kerry v. Din suggests that a consular of½cial should provide an “adequate reason” (to use Justice Breyer’s term) for the denial of a
visa application from a noncitizen abroad with a close family relationship with a U.S. citizen. Even for the dissenters in Din, the “adequate
reason” requirement would have been ful½lled if the of½cial could point to a speci½c subsection of the INA governing terrorism-related
bases for inadmissibility. In Washington v. Trump, however, the issue at stake is the very different question of whether a delay of ninety days
or 120 days (the pauses the EO requires for the seven countries designated as “areas of concern” and for refugee admissions, respectively)
would trigger due process protection.
The fact that the EO arguably requires a delay in admissions, rather than curtailing admissions entirely, is key. United States consular
of½cials process millions of visa applications annually (see the State Department’s latest statistics here). Delays are frequent in the complex
and overburdened visa processing system, and can arise from a daunting array of factors, including hardware problems, software problems,
and requests for more information from consular of½cials.
In this case, the stated purpose of the EO’s delays is the need for more information about visa applicants. That purpose meets the facially
legitimate and bona ½de standard set out in Kerry v. Din. Here’s why: information de½cits affect everyone in visa processing, including
applicants and of½cials. For example, as former principal deputy general counsel at DHS (and University of Virginia law professor) David
Martin noted in a classic article, bona ½de applicants for refugee status encounter dif½culties in obtaining information on conditions in their
countries of origin, but applicants also have “substantial incentives … to embroider the truth.” David and I agree that most applicants are
truthful. But separating embroidery from an objective fear of persecution can be a formidable task. Consider a composite case from my
practice: A client claimed to be a youth from Rwanda’s Tutsi minority, targeted for genocide, but turned out to be a deserter from the
Nigerian army.  I surely missed some warning signs in that case, but my core point is that this uncertainty pervades visa processing, making
delays inevitable. While I don’t favor the ninety-day pause in refugee determinations in the EO, that aspect of the EO passes muster under
the “facially legitimate and bona ½de” standard.
Moreover, though the Ninth Circuit asserts that visa applicants abroad have “potential” due process protections, the protections are not an
unmixed blessing in visa processing. Due process protections could chill consular of½cials who do dif½cult work under trying conditions.
They could also be counterproductive for applicants or U.S. citizen or LPR sponsors, leading to a procession of formalities that would further
delay visa outputs. The Ninth Circuit fails to acknowledge these knotty issues.  
Even more distressingly, the Ninth Circuit’s decision seems appallingly casual about the risk of harm that noncitizens abroad could pose to
the U.S., given the pervasive information asymmetry in visa processing. According to the court, the government must show that a noncitizen
from one of the seven countries listed in the EO (Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen) has “perpetrated a terrorist attack in
the United States.” But that requirement unduly discounts the government’s interest in public safety. Six of the seven countries are
immersed in bloody con¾icts (½ve involving U.S. forces), in which conditions on the ground further complicate the quest for accurate data
about visa applicants. The seventh country, Iran, has been designated by Congress as a state sponsor of terrorism. In this volatile
neighborhood, ramped-up vigilance on the part of the U.S. government is not beyond executive authority. While I view the EO’s measures
regarding the seven countries’ nationals not yet admitted to the U.S. as ill-advised, it would also be inadvisable to frame the U.S.
Constitution as categorically barring the government from taking such steps.  
 
III. The Path Forward
The good news for the government is that revising the EO will put it in the best possible position to highlight the ¾aws in the Ninth Circuit’s
decision and preserve the executive branch’s legitimate statutory and constitutional prerogatives. The revised EO should clearly and
expressly exempt both LPRs and previously admitted nonimmigrant VHs. The government should also include in the EO clear procedures for
waivers available to individuals from the residual group of noncitizens, including refugees, who have not yet been admitted to the United
States.
Moreover, the EO should include clear and speci½c procedures for training DHS personnel in these new criteria (which of course are criteria
that DHS has followed for years regarding LPRs and VHs, prior to the EO’s issuance). Relatedly, the EO should detail procedures for
monitoring DHS personnel’s compliance with the revised EO and promptly reporting violations. This is especially important because it
appears that violations of the already-operative exemption of LPRs occurred early in the EO roll-out, per Faiza Patel’s post here.
Armed with that new EO, the government can seek modi½cation of the Seattle district court’s TRO (now a preliminary injunction) in light of
changed circumstances. An injunction, as the Supreme Court observed in Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms (2010) is a “drastic and
extraordinary remedy.” Because an injunction is so intrusive, in Horne v. Flores (2009), the  Court indicated in an opinion by Justice Alito that
courts need to carefully review the need for injunctive relief when circumstances intervene. The government will regain the initiative it has
lost in the chaos that attended the EO’s roll-out, and the ball will be in Judge Robart’s Seattle court. In that posture, the government will be
best situated to argue that Judge Robart’s original TRO is overbroad. 
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